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Mar k F indl ay 1
International Criminal Court (ICC) supporters argue that there is a need to 
achieve universal ratification so that the majority of mankind will no longer 
remain outside the protection of the ICC. In the Asia/Pacific region there is a 
relatively low accession rate of nation states to the Rome Statute. This paper 
proposes a taxonomy of resistance to ratification in the region, 
recognizing that in speculating on the reasons for resistance to the 
ratification of international criminal justice mechanisms—from the local 
to the global—across Asia and the Pacific, there is a risk in both over 
emphasizing cultural and political difference and at the same time seeking 
universal themes at the expense of real jurisdictional peculiarities. After 
sketching this taxonomy, the paper in part meets the paradox that in Africa 
and South America, where similar features of possible resistance exist, the 
ratification process has been much more widespread.
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1. inTrOdUCTiOn
 The permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was created in 1998,2 but 
for it to grow into a credible global justice institution capable of  enforcing inter-
national criminal law (ICL) and manifesting international criminal justice (ICJ), 
ratification of  the Rome Statute needs to approach a universal international com-
mitment. Aspirations for the court to act as a deterrent and ensure an end to 
impunity cannot even be seriously argued for unless both widespread ratification 
and active cooperation are achieved. Without these foundations the formal aims are 
not available for evaluation beyond the terms of  politicized process initiation and 
selective prosecution.3 
 This article examines the reasons for reluctance to ratify the Rome Statute in 
specific politico-cultural contexts. The discussion begins at the general level by 
looking at issues that determine the initiation of  ICC procedures: the activation 
2  Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) 
[“Rome Statute”].
3  For a discussion of  both these issues, see Mark Findlay, International and Comparative 
Criminal Justice: A Critical Introduction, ch. 3 (Routledge 2013).
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of  an investigation and thereafter prosecution at the ICC level and its politicized 
nature because of  the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s (UNSC) sectarian 
influence. The paper then sets forth how the UN and Member States themselves have 
firewalled exceptions for those involved in peacekeeping operations, UN-sanc-
tioned or otherwise, from effective ICC accountability. The analysis then takes 
its regional/cultural (rather than hegemonic/political) location in the Asia-Pa-
cific region where there is marked resistance to ratification. This enables a general 
sketching of  resistance variables in specific contextual conditions, which might be 
countered by those who advance the essential nexus between universal ratification 
and achieving the deterrent aims of  the ICC.
 In “un-signing”4 the United States (US) from the ICC’s Rome Statute, 
former President George W. Bush referred to “a bunch of  fellas over there 
who want to try our boys.”5 Against the fantasy of  the US’s military per-
sonnel being indicted before the ICC, the US Senate passed the American 
Service-Members Protection Act6 in part as a reassertion of  auton my and sovereignty 
in the face of  the ICC’s jurisdiction. Since then the American position has moved 
from hostility to selective co-operation.
 It could be convincingly argued that world powers with wide international exposure, 
entanglements and presence at many levels that might cut across the ICC’s mandate 
would be wary of  a politicized international court.7 And there can be little doubt 
that the refusal of  the US, China, India and Russia to accept the ICC’s jurisdiction 
has had a heavy negative influence on less powerful states already uncertain of  the 
extending impact of  international law and its institutions.
 It is recognized even by its detractors that today the ICC has an urgent role 
to play in rescuing citizens who are being brutalized by their own governments.8 
Further, religious and cultural diasporas across regions such as Asia are at risk 
that their critical cultural essence and legal traditions may be sidelined through an 
international court and its legal process developing without their influence.
 I have argued that it is critical for criminal justice paradigms other than those in 
civil or common law systems—particularly the hybrid traditions across Asia and 
4  In 2000 former US President Bill Clinton signed the treaty in terms that the US should have 
the chance to observe and assess the functioning of  the court over time before choosing to become 
subject to its jurisdiction; he nevertheless indicated he would not send it to the Senate for ratification. 
His successor George W. Bush “unsigned” the treaty in 2002 by informing the UN that the US 
did not intend to become a party and did not recognize any legal obligations arising from its earlier 
signature.
5  Referenced in James Carroll, Op Ed: Much to Gain for US in World Court, Boston Globe, Mar. 26, 
2012, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/03/25/much-gain-for-world-court/
o5RSzho03iGpSfnC8tNYUI/story.html.
6  American Service-Members’ Protection Act of  2002 (H.R. 4775), Public Law No. 107-206.
7  See generally Findlay, supra note 3, ch. 3.
8  Carroll, supra note 5.
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the Pacific—to engage with the ICC so that otherwise absent procedural influenc-
es on the development of  ICL and process can authenticate the aim of  a holistic 
global criminal law.9 With greater and more representative procedural integration 
comes increased legitimacy and diminished potential for hegemonic capture. The 
Coalition for the ICC10 and its Asian branch11 declare that it is only through the widest 
ratification12 of  the Rome Statute that an independent court will be ensured and 
the end to impunity prevails.13 
 The analysis to follow does not propose either the negative influence of  reluctant and 
self-interested global superpowers or national and regional ambivalence as the 
reason for why Asia and the Pacific are so poorly represented among the ICC 
Member States. The explanations are much more localized and specific, ranging 
from incapacities to enact empowering legislation to profound political misgiv-
ings that go back to pre-independence and through colonial foundations. This 
paper suggests that for any successful policy to be sustained ensuring a wid-
er regional inclusion in the ICC mission, it first must confront and address 
the specific national motivations to decline, and then by drawing out com-
mon themes of  reluctance that span the region, meet these reservations with 
legitimacy rather than promise.14 Having achieved this understanding it is then 
possible to craft arguments in favor of  ratification that will make inclusion in the 
ICC more relevant for the region and more beneficial for the development of  holis-
tic and inclusive ICJ and jurisprudence. The push for ratification from the ICC and 
the Coalition must not appear to be another phase of  western colonization but as 
an opportunity for Asian and Pacific traditions to reach their appropriate level of  
9  See generally Mark Findlay, The Challenges for Asian Jurisdictions in the Development of International Criminal 
Justice, 32 Sydney L. Rev. 215 (2010).
10  Coalition for the International Criminal Court website, at http://www.iccnow.org/.
11  Coalition for the International Criminal Court website, Asia and the Pacific region, at http://
coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=region&idureg=7. 
12  Out of  the 24 countries in Asia, only 9 (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Maldives, 
Mongolia, the Philippines, the Republic of  Korea, Timor-Leste and Japan) have ratified the Rome 
Statute. The Asian region remains significantly under-represented at the Court, although civil society 
has been strong in advocating for international justice and the rule of  law across the continent. Of  
the ICC States Parties, only the Republic of  Korea has enacted implementing legislation. Afghanistan 
is taking appropriate steps in coordination with civil society groups to initiate their implementing 
legislation process, and Mongolia set up a working group on the ICC to discuss and follow up on 
ICC implementation some years ago, but the process has been stalled for some time. Cambodia 
and Timor-Leste have similarly moved slowly in effectively carrying out their emergent obligations 
under the Rome Statute. In the region, only the Republic of  Korea has ratified the Agreement on the 
Privileges and Immunities of  the Court (APIC). Although Mongolia is a signatory, it still needs to 
move forward and ratify this crucial instrument.
13  Coalition for the International Criminal Court Asia Pacific Regional Strategy Meeting, Quezon 
City, The Philippines (Apr. 11-12, 2011), at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICC_Asia_
RSM_April_2011_Final_Recommendations.pdf.
14  Mark Findlay & Ralph Henham, Beyond Punishment: Achieving International Criminal 
Justice, ch. 8 (Palgrave Macmillan 2009).
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recognition in a new global justice ordering.
2. ViEW FrOM THE TOP—WHy SiGn UP?
 In his recent delivery of  the Wallace Wurth Memorial Lecture,15 the President 
of  the ICC Judge Sang-Hyun Song quite consciously laid out the pitch for joining 
the Member States. In the audience there were representatives of  Asian and Pacific 
governments that have yet to ratify the Rome Statute and many aspects of  the 
argument were addressed to them.
 The President’s case was as follows:
 •  The preventive influence of  the ICC is a most attractive capacity for justice 
and peacemaking.
 •  In particular, deterrence, timely intervention, the independence of   
preliminary investigation, contributing to medium term stabilization and 
longer term equitable development,16 victim empowerment through  
participating in trial justice in their own right, and victim assistance to  
recognize non-retributive victim needs,17 each advance this preventive  
capacity.
 •  The role of  the court in norm setting embodies its greatest potential  
influence for peacemaking. In this role the court recognizes the distance  
between international treaties and local norms that needs to be bridged. 
 •  Complementarity18 supports the peace and justice efforts of  civil society 
emerging from post-conflict struggles by conceding to the nation state the 
right and the primary duty to investigate and prosecute crimes that are within 
the jurisdiction of  the ICC. Complementarity also links into the deterrent 
function by facilitating the local prosecution of  such crimes with the capacity 
building consequences that this offers, thereby carrying through the expres-
sive function of  the ICC when the international legal norms of  the Rome 
15  Judge Sang-Hyun Song, From Punishment to Prevention: Reflections on the Future of International Criminal 
Justice, Wallace Wurth Memorial Lecture, Univ. of  New South Wales, Sydney (Feb. 14, 2012), available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/29D0B2A7-71D4-457A-B9A3-9AC4E78DD968/2842
66/120214ICCPresidentUNSWWallaceWurthmemoriallecture.pdf. 
16  See World Bank Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development, The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (2011) (identifying transitional justice as 
forestalling cycles of  violence in post conflict contexts), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf.
17  The judge referred to 40,000 direct beneficiaries of  the reparation process of  the ICC in 
association with initiatives of  governments such as the US, targeting victims of  sexual violence in the 
Central African Republic.
18  For a detailed discussion of  this concept, see Findlay, supra note 3, ch. 3.
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Statute are translated into domestic norms of  that state.
 •  Even with the domestic justice systems of  states carrying out the investiga-
tion and prosecution of  crimes within the purview of  the ICC, the ICC pro-
vides a safety net ensuring accountability of  states in terms of  their criminal 
justice capacity and service delivery.
 •  The ICC recognizes the need for state co-operation to give the ICC the pow-
er to arrest, the ability to collect evidence and to encourage witness testimony.
 •  In addition, there is a need to achieve universality so that the majority of  
mankind presently outside the Rome Statute’s protection will not remain 
outside the protection of  the ICC.
 In his closing remarks, the President reiterated his realistic understanding that 
the on-the-ground potentials and the stakeholder legitimacy of  ICJ are critical to 
its success. For this reason how the potential and legitimacy of  global justice insti-
tutions and processes are viewed in different cultural and political settings and his-
tories may explain the erratic take-up of  ICC membership. As such, a bottom-up 
analysis of  resistance to ratification is necessary if  the ICC is to construct a more 
effective and convincing push for universal ratification.
 However, the forces waged against the nature and jurisdiction of  the ICC cannot 
be presumed to be equally, consistently or universally opposed to the intervention 
of  ICJ for the maintenance of  global ordering. A brief  consideration of  the UNSC’s 
powers as they relate to international criminal justice (referring matters to the ICC, 
authorizing peacekeeping missions, and controlling the ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR)), taken together 
with the ongoing cases relating to Darfur, Sudan, reveals just how complex can be the 
contradictory tensions between the appearance of  non-engagement projected 
through non-ratification, and the national or hegemonic self-interest behind the 
activation of  international crime control on a case-by-case basis for invoking the 
process otherwise reviled. In introducing these considerations it is also important 
to understand what motivates international criminal prosecutions, and alternatively 
what brands them and the justice process they initiate politicized and partial.
3. inTErnaTiOnal CriMinal JUSTiCE  
PrOSECUTiOn TriGGErS
 ICL operates in a complex reality of  international relations. Decisions to prose-
cute provide a telling example of  how ICL (and its rules and procedures) manifests 
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itself  as part of  international relations power balancing.19 For example, the trigger 
for initiating prosecution before the ICC occurs via a referral by the UNSC, or 
from a State Party, as provided for in the Rome Statute, representing a countermea-
sure to the Prosecutor’s otherwise independent exercise discretion.20 The UNSC 
can also request that the Prosecutor not commence an investigation or prosecu-
tion for a period of  12 months (a delaying or prohibition tactic which can be 
renewed).21 As such the UNSC is politically connected with the ICC through its 
initiation and sponsorship power, by referring matters for investigation and pros-
ecution,22 and deferring the investigation or prosecution of  a matter for a set or 
ongoing period.23 This powerful dominion exercised by the UNSC Members and 
exacerbated through the self-interest behind the veto power, potentially has the 
consequence of  investing in the permanent members of  the UNSC—in particular 
the US and China—the power to control referrals (through a resolution referring 
a case to the ICC, vetoing any such resolutions against their interests, or should an 
investigation or prosecution be initiated by any means, deferring the commence-
ment or process at their pleasure).24
 The inextricable link between the ICC and the UNSC identifies the inevitable 
nexus between the formal operations of  ICJ and sectarian global political hege-
mony.25 The power of  referral or deferral emanating from the UNSC in particu-
lar justifies suspicion about the extent of  prosecutorial independence to evaluate 
and determine these referrals.26 Such reservations have grounding in the politi-
cal expedience of  UNSC power constellations, demonstrated by the UNSC’s re-
solve to make peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia immune from ICC prosecu-
tion.27 UNSC resolutions excluding the ICC’s jurisdiction over peacekeepers from 
19  See generally Mark Findlay & Clare McLean, Emerging International Criminal Justice, 18:3 Current 
Issues Crim. J. 457 (2007).
20  Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).
21  Id. art. 16.
22  Id. art. 13(b). Note as well that State parties (arts. 13(a), 14(1)), and the Prosecutor (art. 
15(1)) can also refer matters to trigger the ICC jurisdiction. 
23  The UNSC is empowered to do this under UN Charter, Ch. VII. United Nations, Charter of 
the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. The ICC requirement to abide by such Security 
Council Resolution arises from the Rome Statute art. 16.
24  See generally David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93:1 Am. J. Int’l L. 
12 (1999). 
25  Findlay, supra note 3, ch. 3.
26  See generally Chris Gallavin, Prosecutorial Discretion within the ICC: Under the Pressure of Justice, 17:1 
Crim. L.F. 43 (2006).
27  See generally Neha Jain, A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the 
International Criminal Court, 16:2 Eur. J. Int’l L. 239 (2005).
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non-party states in Bosnia and Herzegovina28 were made in response to the US 
threatening to veto the renewal of  the UNSC’s mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
if  the resolution was not made.29 Similar UNSC resolutions provided immunity 
to peacekeepers in the conflict in Liberia, deployed to secure the country for hu-
manitarian assistance and prepare for future UN forces with stabilization duties.30 
So evidenced, the UNSC potentially holds the power to determine whose actions 
are included or excluded from accountability before the ICC, through authorizing 
those operating with immunity for UN intervention purposes.31 
 The influence of  the UNSC is even more pronounced over the ad hoc tribunals, 
established as a subsidiary of  the UNSC, which can disband them at any time. 
Ultimately, the UNSC’s determination of  the scope of  a tribunal’s investigation 
and prosecution mandate and its capacity to define its temporal jurisdiction and 
terminate its hearings (for the ICTY and ICTR, in respect of  new cases, as of  
2012) mean that the very exercise of  ICJ is hegemonically dependent.32
4. nOn-raTiFiCaTiOn BUT STandinG and UTiliTy?
 The UNSC adopted a similar resolution as that indemnifying troops in the 
former Yugoslavia conflict, covering non-Sudanese officials in the operations in 
Darfur (originally authorized by the UNSC and the African Union). The res-
olution provided that those personnel would be (if  at all) subject to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of  their home state, and thus protected from ICC prosecu-
tion.33 In practice, however, the reality of  politically selective prosecution and 
specific offence and proof  limitations governing the ICC’s jurisdiction at large, 
might make these UNSC resolutions less than necessary. That being so, the 
resolutions still represent attempts to circumscribe the jurisdiction of  inter-
national courts and tribunals in a manner that suggests primary motivation by 
28  Security Council Resolution 1422 requested the ICC exercise its discretion under Art 16 to 
refrain from the commencing investigation or prosecution of  any case involving actions related to 
operations authorised by the United Nations for a 12-month period. This period was subsequently 
renewed in Security Council Resolution 1487. See United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Doc. S/RES/1422 
(2002); United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003).
29  Jain, supra note 27.
30  Security Council Resolution 1497 however was stronger than that of  1422. It provides exclusive 
jurisdiction of  the contributing sovereign states over their staff, for an indefinite period. See UN Doc. 
S/RES/1497 (2003).
31  Megan Bastick, Karin Grimm & Rahel Kunz, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and 
Implications for the Security Sector, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of  Armed Forces (2007), 
available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/sexualviolence_conflict_full%5B1%5D.pdf.
32  See generally Vesselin Popovski, International Criminal Court: A Necessary Step Towards Global Justice, 31:4 
Security Dialogue 405 (2000).
33  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005). For more 
detail see Gallavin, supra note 26.
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the hegemonic politics of  international relations, specifically, the conditions 
and negotiation strategies adopted by Member States including the US for 
their contributions to humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, as they seek to pro-
tect their personnel from prosecution by the ICC. In the future, this feature of  
security trade-off  at the UNSC level either may not be quite as blatant or intracta-
ble, as the UN moves away from its military intervention model for peacekeeping 
in preference for broader-based justice resolutions.34
 The question of  standing for accused persons in the international criminal 
tribunals and permanent court is also dependent on the way in which they be-
come identified and produced as part of  the investigation and prosecution pro-
cess. In domestic criminal justice, the institutionalization of  complex policing 
arrangements means that a suspect goes through a standardized and detailed 
process of  investigation before being arrested and charged. However, at the interna-
tional level, the pathway of  suspect identification and processing is less formalized 
and predictable because of  difficulties with policing (heavily reliant as it is on na-
tion states and mutual assistance) and with countervailing tensions associated with 
jurisdictional autonomy that militate against cooperation. Accused persons can be 
offered up by a Member State to the ICC, identified by a UNSC referral, or the 
independent prosecutor can issue an arrest warrant that requires the accused to be 
presented for the investigation and trial process. Yet, as certain recent celebrated 
instances indicate, if  accused persons can use their political status or their domes-
tic and regional authority to resist the process of  indictment at the national and 
international levels, then the production of  that accused before an international 
tribunal or court is much more complicated and deeply problematic.35 
 The reasoning behind a UNSC referral can also be revealing when reflected 
against national interest and international relations alignments. Despite its rejec-
tion of  the jurisdiction of  the ICC over its citizens, the US pushed through the 
UNSC a referral to the ICC for the prosecution of  the President of  Sudan. As a 
result, the ICC has sought the indictment of  Sudan’s President Omar Bashir since 
2005 for his involvement in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
Darfur region.36 However, in July 2008 the African Union, in a meeting of  heads 
of  African states, resolved to call for the ICC to suspend its action and instead 
permit an African-led investigation. Since then, numerous African States—Chad, 
Kenya, Djibouti, and Malawi—have refused to comply with their ICC Member 
34  John Boonstra, Tension Between Peace and Justice, UN Dispatch, Feb. 28, 2008, at http://www.
undispatch.com/tension-between-peace-and-justice.  
35  See, e.g., Bernard Momanyi, Kenya Seeks Delay to ICC Trials, ACR Issue 366, IWPR, Oct. 17, 2013, 
available at http://iwpr.net/report-news/kenya-seeks-delay-icc-trials.
36  President Bashir was referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council, as Sudan is 
not a Member State.
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State obligations such as arrest requests for Bashir when he was present in their 
country. The ICC judges have reported these countries to the UNSC and the ICC 
Assembly of  State Parties, but no action has since been taken.37 Most recently in 
December 2011, the ICC reminded Malawi of  the International Court of  Justice 
Arrest Warrant Case that confirmed that the principle in international law providing 
immunity for former or sitting Heads of  State does not apply to prevent criminal 
prosecution by an international court regardless of  whether the alleged offending 
state is a Member State to the ICC.38
5. naTiOnal V. GlOBal inTErESTS — STOriES OF POliTiCal 
EXPEdiEnCy
 As indicated above, when an offence within the subject matter jurisdiction of  the ICC is 
committed in a territory or by a State Party, that State Party can refer the accused 
for prosecution by the ICC,39 or the Prosecutor may initiate her own investiga-
tion of  that crime which may commence, provided the Pre-Trial Chamber grants 
authorization.40 In addition, the UNSC can refer the matters to the ICC,41 and 
non-state parties can accept the jurisdiction of  the ICC on a case-by-case basis.42 
One of  the foundational concerns held by those states that have resisted the ICC 
jurisdiction is that the independent Prosecutor may use her discretion to charge 
military personnel who have been involved in UN peacekeeping missions or in a 
military intervention designed to secure the regional and international interests. 
 Obviously, the US has a large exposure in these areas. As well as not being a State 
Party to the Rome Statute, under the Bush Administration the US also struck a raft 
of  bi-lateral agreements requiring that signatory states promise not to surrender 
US citizens or employees to the ICC, and thereby restricting the ICC jurisdiction 
and indemnifying US military forces.43 The US sought these agreements to avail 
37  ICC judges Dismiss Legality of African Union Decision on Bashir, Refer Malawi’s Non-Compliance 
to UNSC, Sudan Tribune, Dec. 13, 2011, at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.
php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=40980.
38  Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (PTC I, Dec. 12, 
2011); Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of  11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of  the Congo v. 
Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14, 2002).
39  Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 13(a), 14.
40  Id. arts. 13(c), 15.
41  Id. art. 13(b); Charter of  the United Nations, ch. VII.
42   Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3).
43  See generally Scheffer, supra note 24; Markus Benzing, US Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements and Article 
98 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Exercise in the Law of Treaties, 8:1 Max Planck Year 
Book UN L. 181 (2004), available at http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/mpunyb_benzing_8.pdf; Judith 
G. Kelley, Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-
surrender Agreements, 3:101 Am. Poli Sci Rev. 573 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=943711.
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itself  of  the exemption from jurisdiction, set out in the Rome Statute at Article 
98(2), which provides that the ICC “may not proceed with a request for surrender 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of  a sending State is 
required to surrender a person of  that State to the Court, unless the Court can first 
obtain the cooperation of  the sending State for the giving of  consent for the sur-
render.”44 These agreements were fortified by the US’s offer of  military assistance 
and other forms of  financial aid, and conversely the US’s threatened withdrawal of  
military aid from recipient states that refused to sign non-surrender agreements.45 
 More particularly, the UNSC also expressed its concern about the protection of  
states involved in UN peacekeeping operations. Crucial to this concern about au-
tonomy and the protection of  military personnel was the fear that the independent 
Prosecutor would proceed against powerful states without recognition of  the UN’s 
political interests in military intervention.
 In the ways discussed above, the dominant world powers treat ICJ as secondary 
to their own national interests, and this is not only witnessed in the autonomy 
arguments of  those states that refuse to accept ICC jurisdiction.46 Co sequentially, 
pressure transfers onto international organizations and the non-governmental or-
ganization (NGO) community to genuinely contribute to ICJ beyond the limita-
tions of  domestic and regional considerations.47 This has already been particularly 
the case with the ICC Prosecutor’s constant and sometimes controversial reliance 
on NGO field intelligence and intervention to critically facilitate the identification 
of  witnesses and the supply of  testimony.48 From the foundation of  the ICC at 
the Rome Conference, “the relationship between the ICC and NGOs has proba-
bly been closer, more consistent, and more vital to the ICC than have analogous 
relations between NGOs and any other international organization,” with all the 
problems this can entail.49 
44   Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98(2).
45  See Kelley, supra note 43, at 573. Note however, due to security concerns, the US did not 
withdraw military aid from all those states that refused to sign agreements not to surrender US 
citizens to ICC jurisdiction.
46  See generally Jason Ralph, Defending the Society of  States: Why America Opposes the 
International Criminal Court and Its Vision of  World Society (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 
2007).
47  See the International Center for Transitional Justice website, http://ictj.org/about.
48  Article 54(3)(c) of  the Rome Statute gives the Prosecutor the power to seek the cooperation 
of  any State or intergovernmental organisation or arrangement in accordance with its respective 
competence and/or mandate. Rome Statute, supra note 2.
49  See generally Benjamin Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2008). For a discussion of  the problematic consequences of  this dependency for the production 
of  truthful witness testimony, see generally Mark Findlay & Sylvia Ngane, The Sham of the Moral Court: 
Testimony Sold as the Spoils of War, 1:1 Global J. Comp. L. 73 (2013).
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 Justifications for the conclusion that ICJ is politically expedient in its inception, 
activation and renunciation include:
 •   That commonly purported justifications, such as the end to impunity, disguise 
less altruisticmotivations. This duplicity is demonstrated by the intensely se-
lective nature of  prosecutions determined by and on behalf  of  ICJ. Such selec-
tivity was evident from the early days of  ICJ in its present epoch. In the Tokyo 
war crimes trials for instance, Emperor Hirohito, known to be the inspiration 
behind terrible crimes, was not charged, as it was feared to do so would delay 
the cessation of  war in the Pacific.50
 •   The circumspection surrounding purported altruistic motivations as to why 
states would createnational and international prosecution institutions that 
might end up turning against them. The US, for instance, has withheld its 
formal involvement in the ICC in part out of  concern that the ICC acts on 
the mandate and interests of  the UNSC, and due to the contrary application 
of  the UNSC veto powers by contesting superpowers,51 US interests may not 
always accord with ICC indictments. The strange flipside of  this concern is 
that as a permanent member of  the UNSC itself, the US can also apply the 
veto at least to protect its interests against indictment. Despite such partiality 
in reservations, one might say that many of  those nation states that support 
the ICC do so as they believe that the ICC will never be turned against the 
interests of  the powerful.
 The temptation lies to extrapolate from the political nature of  the ICC and the 
associated reservations of  superpowers, and formulate some similar reasoning as to 
why nation states in the Asia/Pacific region are reluctant to accede to the court’s 
jurisdiction. I suggest below that there are more interesting and convincing his-
torical, cultural, anthropological and social conditions that might provide a more 
persuasive explanation.
6. rEaSOnS FOr nOn-raTiFiCaTiOn in THE rEGiOn — 
 STaTE SEnSiTiViTiES and rEGiOnal rElUCTanCE
 Throughout Asia and the Pacific the contemporary face of  criminal justice is 
etched by:
50  See generally Arnold Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of  the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trials (1987).
51  The UNSC operates with the capacity for permanent Member States to veto Council 
resolutions. This sometimes leads to a “stand-off ” between members trying to utilise referral powers, 
and those resisting the referral.
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 • European colonial traditions; 
 • indigenous and migratory cultural influences; 
 • the pressures of  subsistence and trade economies; 
 • the clash of  home-grown and introduced religions; 
 • the obligations of  tribal loyalty and filial piety; and 
 • the relentless advance of  modernization and materialism.52
 The impact of  these forces has been neither even nor consistent. What remains 
constant is the dislocation between the institutions of  state-based criminal justice 
and the processes of  traditional dispute resolution and decision-making. Endeavor 
to overlay this with the “one-size-fits-all” package of  global justice and it is not 
difficult to see how the fissures of  resistance would open wide.53
 In identifying the reasons for resistance to the ratification of  ICJ mech-
anisms—local to the global—across Asia and the Pacific, there is a risk 
in both over emphasizing cultural and political differences while at the 
same time seeking universal themes at the expense of  real jurisdictional 
peculiarities. A way around this is to suggest a taxonomy of reluctance that recognizes 
critical influences over modern criminal justice in the region. In putting together this 
skeleton, it is necessary to reflect in passing, even if  only for the purposes of  summary, 
on the disconnect between formalized justice processes (as exhibited in the ICC) and 
indigenous or embedded manners of  resolving conflict in the cultures of  this region. 
Such dissonance in the way justice is determined, adjudicated and resolved might 
even be enough to suggest why some states and cultures are disinterested in the global 
alternative especially when it is so foreign to the experience of  their people.
 6.1.  relevance?
 Particularly in the Pacific there are perceived many greater global crises than 
those revealed through the crimes in the ICC jurisdiction, which small na-
tion states would prioritize against their limited capacity for international en-
gagement. Small Pacific Island states have identified global warming and rising 
sea levels as the main issue for social “justice” that they consider requiring ur-
gent action by institutions of  the international community. Political lead-
ers and their people in the Pacific are perplexed that the environmental degra-
52  See generally Mark Findlay, Decolonising Restoration and Justice: Restoration in Transitional Cultures, in 
Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice 185 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite, eds., William 
Morrow & Co. 2000).
53  Peace Operations and Organized Crime: Enemies or Allies? (James Cockayne & Adam 
Lupel eds., Routledge 2011).
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dation that threatens the displacement of  nations and cultures is not seen as a 
“crime against humanity” or that such displacement, through no fault of  island 
inhabitants, does not qualify as cultural “genocide.”54
 In a region where “aid dependency” features to support many fragile economies 
and political regimes, relations beyond the nation state are fostered by bilateral-
ism rather than multilateralism. Internationalism is not necessarily complementary 
with the economic interactions that benefit the North World in terms of  trade and 
resources and obligate the South World through debt slavery and aid reliance.
 Another relevant issue, particularly as it relates to small Pacific Island States and 
to under resourced or emerging Asian jurisdictions, is limited legislative capacity. 
Many administrations have very restricted legislative services that—when it comes 
to UN convention ratification—need to be rationed against state priorities for 
international engagement.
 ICC ratification advocates need to substantiate a global criminal justice system 
that helps rather than burdens these small states with their concerns. 
 6.2. Global reach
 The “dead hand” of  differential superpower influence (economically and dip-
lomatically) in the region is commonly represented by international organizations 
and agencies in the pursuit of  modernization as socio-economic development.55 
Due to the nature of  this development policy, cultures of  dependency have re-
placed colonial administration and obligation, advancing the culturally destructive 
impacts of  aid allocation, trade exploitation, and exchange capitalism in subsistence 
economies. Rather than socio-economic development promoting inclusion with-
in the positive dimensions of  globalization across the region, colonial histories 
of  bilateralism pervade foreign and commercial relations within and outside 
Asia and the Pacific. Particularly when nation states are weak or disaggregat-
ed, bilateral dependencies and obligations can stand in the way of  ICJ whereby 
powerful North World states can bargain to require the endorsement of  their own 
autonomy and national interest in return for economic or military favors.
 What makes the absence of  global reach a particular problem in the Asia-Pacific 
region is a significant number of  micro political units, or macro states with enor-
mous domestic challenges (e.g. food sustainability, cultural cohesion, environmen-
tal depletions), coupled with a distinct absence of  regional political or economic 
54  See generally Clement Tisdell, Global Warming and the Future of Pacific Island Countries, 35:12 Int’l J. 
Soc. Econ. 889 (Oct. 2008).
55  Mark Findlay, The Globalisation of  Crime: Understanding the Transitional 
Relationships of  Crime in a Global Context, Ch. 2 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
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solidarity that might argue for global inclusion, or at least collectively counter the 
risk from North World exploitation. Particularly when it comes to the commercial 
depletion of  natural resources, the region has suffered the negative impact of  glo-
balization while at the same time being largely excluded from its material benefits. 
In such a situation there is little popular taste for internationalism, or any prevail-
ing and genuine faith in international justice paradigms.
 This reluctance is compounded by an inadequate understanding of  how 
the ICC operates, and more specifically the principle of  complementari-
ty. Even when a state has ratified the Rome Statute, its national courts will 
still have the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the crimes that are 
within the purview of  the ICC. It is only if  its own domestic justice mechanisms 
are unable or unwilling to perform such functions will the ICC step in to initiate 
its own investigations and processes.56 Therefore, the ICC still has to communicate 
with that state and make a determination on a case-by-case basis notwithstand-
ing ratification. ICC membership will also not derogate from the autonomy of  
functioning national legal systems in that citizens have no standing to bring cases 
directly to the ICC.57
 Ramification advocates, therefore, should endeavor to clarify the practi-
cal circumscription of  ICC jurisdiction, or have the circumstances neces-
sary for the activation of  its jurisdiction more clearly defined. Such speci-
fication would have the effect of  mollifying the misconception on the part of  
suspicious states that membership in the ICC would add another set of  external 
obligations over which they have no administrative as well as political influence.
 6.3. Post-Colonial Hangover
 It would be fair to say that, as with most post-colonial regions, in recently in-
dependent states in Asia and the Pacific region there is reflected a residual fear of  
“westernization.” Tensions are obvious between the resilience of  strong indigenous 
cultures, and the demands of  cash economies. The spread of  religious fundamen-
talism across the region has also tended to vilify western culture.
 To particularize this post-colonial resentment, the relatively recent mem-
ory of  the colonial excesses exacted through the mechanisms of  crimi-
nal justice, resonate throughout the independence histories of  the region 
State-sponsored criminal justice institutions and processes have come to 
56  See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
57  Usman Hamid, Why Indonesia, Asia Must Ratify the Rome Statute, Jakarta Post, Nov. 15, 2011, 
available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/15/why-indonesia-asia-must-ratify-
rome-statute.html.
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represent, and perpetuate through elitist post-colonial administrations, the dis-
criminatory dominion of  the powerful over the populous rather than any system 
of  universal justice. 
 In Asia and the Pacific ancient routes of  migration meant that indigenous cul-
tures were exposed to a constant transition of  colonization. Add to this the unique 
treasures of  trade that attracted the West to the East and it is not hard to un-
derstand why, when the bonds of  colonial rule are released, there is no eagerness 
to compromise hard-fought-for autonomy in return for a notion of  westernized 
justice that could represent just another layer of  imperial influence.
 Because Asian cultures in particular have been suspicious about, and therefore 
misunderstanding of  internationalization or polarity that is interpreted as west-
ernization, transitional or developing Asian economies have adapted western ad-
ministration and commercial organization to suit their own priorities. Despite the 
language of  constitutional legality, in many Asian political and social frameworks 
individualized rights that are said to underpin principled western criminal justice 
models may not be valued above communitarian cohesion. Pacific Island tribalism 
has similar priorities.
 Pacific Island states usually retain the trappings of  Westminster parliamentary 
government. However, as these frameworks are so often ill suited to social organi-
zations with intricate bonds of  obligation and clan duty, traditional ties of  com-
munity cohesion have become perverted through corruption and exploitation.58 
Corrupt political elites have a vested interest in distancing any intrusive institutions 
of  international governance and accountability, such as ICJ claims to be.59
 If  the institutions of  ICJ and the international governance mechanisms that 
sponsor them are viewed by the small Asia Pacific States in particular as the repre-
sentatives of  global political and economic hegemony, then they will be avoided as 
such. For post-colonial states in Africa and in South America that might share the 
same reservations, those torn by internal military and political struggle or ravaged 
by secessionist movements may be willing even to engage hegemonic dominion in 
the hope of  political preferment or conflict resolution through the criminalization 
of  their enemies.
 It is only through communication and consultations with Member States that organic 
developments of  ICJ occur through its institutions, and as the ICC is to some 
extent subordinated to the interests of  powerful states such as the permanent mem-
bers of  the UN, it also needs to be open to influences from small or less hegemonic 
58  See generally Mark Findlay, Misunderstanding Corruption and Community: Comparative Cultural Politics of 
Corruption Regulation in the Pacific, 2:1 Asian J. Criminology 47 (June 2007).
59  See generally Mark Findlay, Governing through Globalised Crime (Willian Publishing 2008).
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states and their procedural traditions.60 The ICC can take the UN’s intimated tran-
sition towards broader-based justice paradigms as a cue to situate ICJ in the most 
culturally inclusive (rather than politically selective) processes of  justice delivery. 
The new inclusivity approach complements the need for developments in substan-
tive ICL and procedure that recognize collective liability, criminal organizations, 
and the resultant responsibilities of  offender communities to communities of  vic-
tims.61 
 6.4. normative identity
 The terms “Asian values” or the “Pacific way” are commonly employed when ex-
plaining the determination of  political autonomy and regional engagement across 
the region. In a governance sense, this attempt to link the conceptualization of  na-
tionhood with fundamental traditions is more than cultural relativity. For instance, 
if  one examines the development of  hybrid criminal justice traditions in Asia and the 
Pacific, these are explained at least in part by different notions of  justice and of  citi-
zen responsibility than those that may prevail in North World or westernized justice 
paradigms, which are the predominant models for ICJ. Again, normative distinc-
tion as an explanation for reluctance to engage with ICJ might be countered by the 
many examples in Africa and South America where nation states equally jealous of  
their post-colonial sovereignty and autonomy have signed up to the Rome Statute. 
What else influences the Asian and Pacific normative exceptionalism? 
 Digging deeper into normative identity at a nation state level presents the danger 
in generalizing normative enunciation across such a culturally and developmentally 
diverse region. Recognizing this, and looking at the constitution of  those states in 
the region that remain outside the ICC, post-colonial cultural and political stabil-
ity is not uncommon. The embedding of  an independent political identity within 
long established cultural foundations, even in the more volatile post-colonial states 
in Asia and the Pacific, is regularly endorsed through strong centralist or paternalist 
political frameworks that celebrate sovereignty. The relatively weak regional politi-
cal and economic alliances in Asia and the Pacific are a further evidence of  resilient 
and prevailing nation state autonomy.
 To meet such concerns, the ICC can do more to demonstrate how ratification of  
the Rome Statute underscores and not subverts nation state autonomy by paying 
attention to the aspects and peculiarities of  the until-now unrepresented justice 
paradigms. Engagement with the ICC is an opportunity for Asian and Pacific Is-
land states to assert their normative identity by influencing the development of  a 
global criminal jurisprudence. 
60  See generally Findlay, supra note 9. 
61  See generally id.
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 In the case of  China, the Confucian and communist ascription to social order 
above the individual, as recognized in their system of  criminal law (imperial and 
modern), has provided fertile soil from which communitarian resolution practices 
such as victim participation in both mediation and the trial process, and victims’ 
right to compensation, have grown.62 Therefore, entry of  China into the ICC 
debate, bringing with it collective and communitarian rights consideration, holds 
enormous potential for collective crime prevention and aggregated social order to 
assume a greater place in ICJ.
 6.5.  Constitutional legality
 Another frame of  reference that might explain the reluctance to engage with ICJ 
across the region is constitutional legality. Asian and Pacific Island states recurrently 
demonstrate dismal human rights records by UN standards, despite the prolifera-
tion of  sophisticated constitutions with human rights charters and leadership codes 
that appear “rights focused.” This paradox might be explained by both the prob-
lematic application of  Westminster parliamentarianism, and the underdeveloped or 
corrupted stages of  representative democracy. Another explanation, in states such 
as China, is a disconnect between the discourse of  constitutionalism and the per-
severance of  administrative traditions that rely on non-accountable and expansive 
individualized discretion.
 The heavy emphasis on humanitarian rights principles that underpins the formal 
institutions of  ICJ does not sit well with political frameworks that do not respect 
rights protection in practice, and instead rely on cultural and political informalities 
(such as clan loyalties), which frustrate accountability for rights violations. Again, 
what might distinguish any such regional reluctance based on the rights dilemma 
from other regions where states have signed the Rome Statute while also devaluing 
rights and political accountability, is the marked absence of  any Asian regional 
rights superstructure, combined with recent history of  political regimes that oper-
ated (and some continue to operate) systematic rights repression.
 It is anticipated that the intervention of  the ICC will be both more like-
ly and more attractive for states when their domestic criminal justice ca-
pacity—and more particularly the place of  the trial process within con-
stitutional legality—is fragile, strained or compromised and dependent. 
Interestingly, despite the varied levels of  economic development and political com-
petence, nation states across the Pacific and Asia (perhaps as a consequence of  
colonial control policies) often exhibit relatively well-resourced, centralized and 
62  See generally id.  
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resilient criminal juridical institutions and traditions. It may provide some comfort 
for states reluctant to concede to international jurisdiction that the state’s formal 
justice processes possess the capacity to manage their own affairs for crimes within 
the ICC’s jurisdiction.
 6.6. Executive discretion
 Aligned with the final observation above, many nation states in Asia and the 
Pacific region have suffered under recent dictatorships or military governance, and 
a history of  coups. Centralist governance frameworks in China, India, Pakistan 
and Indonesia have meant that the majority of  the world’s population has been 
administered with a tight hand of  centralist government.
 In such regimes a residually powerful security sector in the military and po-
lice proliferates. Governance through fear of  the consequences of  opposition 
or dissent for the individual citizen has meant that a healthy adversarialism is 
scarce in civil society. Freedom of  expression, independent media, and alte na-
tive political organization are restricted. Communities become compliant. In 
such governance environments, administrative discretion is centralized, pervasive, 
and largely not responsible to the people but to the powerful. Therefore prac-
tices of  impunity are tolerated because the leadership of  such states are often 
themselves perpetrators of  serious crimes, whether through action or omission. 
The invitation to participate in a justice process that has the potential to re-
quire international accountability above the interests of  the nation state is, not 
surprisingly, unlikely to be attractive for governments dedicated to the denial of  domestic 
accountability obligations.
6.7. Civil Society
 Throughout the Asia Pacific region, the immaturity of  civil society as a political 
force has meant that grassroots support for ICJ is difficult to muster.63 Tribalism, 
caste and cultural hierarchies have tended to mechanically stratify civil society and 
prevent organic movements of  victims that would pressure for ICJ engagement. In 
this political environment, NGOs have been frequently restricted, and the fracture 
of  oppositional political movements has made the growth of  domestic agitation 
for ICJ difficult.
 A unique feature of  civil society in the region has been its complacency. This is 
not always a consequence of  fear through repression. In the case of  Singapore, for 
instance, authoritarian governance has been imposed and maintained through ma-
63  Coalition for the International Criminal Court website, A Universal Court with Global 
Support, at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=ratimp.
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terialist and economic advancement. Society in such circumstances complies with 
government as it perceives in non-compliance a risk to socio-economic benefit. In 
addition, although the wealth gap in Singapore is one of  the starkest world-wide, the 
doctrine of  meritocracy transposes responsibility for wealth creation onto the indi-
vidual within society, dispossessing the state of  any duty to redress the balance and 
to become the obvious focus for the dissent of  the disadvantaged.
 The complex webs of  obligation and patronage are another characteristic of  
compliant civil society. Stimulated by commodity and cash economy development 
models, these relationships may also foster corruption that in turn controls civil 
society through the giving and receiving of  advantage.
 Common to both centralist and paternalist states in the region is the manner in 
which they effectively exclude civil society from participatory governance or fail to 
activate inclusion beyond the obligations that the state identifies.64 These obliga-
tions are designed to complement core cultural beliefs that necessitate compliance 
and that, when required, enforce conservative adherence to the established order.
 Ratification advocates should work through civil society in oppressive state re-
gimes to exploit the accountability and governance potential of  ICJ, embodied in 
institutions such as the ICC.65 Such a push can also come from academia and the 
media, which play a role in cultivating the potential of  civil society activism. 
7. COnClUSiOn
 In endeavoring to understand the relatively low accession rate to ICC Member 
State standing across the Asia Pacific region, this paper has located a range of  ex-
planations in social and cultural contexts, rather than essentially focusing on politi-
cal determinations. The hypothesis is that the social conditions resistant to engage-
ment with ICJ, prevailing in the nations states across the region, can be identified, 
distinguished and, if  possible, addressed by the forces promoting ICC membership. 
However some of  these conditions, such as relevance and capacity, require much 
more developmental and political adjustment than mere promotion of  the values 
of  ICJ can attain. Such adjustment would be necessary within states, and from the 
formal institutions of  ICJ as well, if  engagement in the region is to be made more 
viable and more attractive.
 The development of  nation state receptivity to the benefits of  global gover-
nance that institutions like the ICC can and should offer, holds out an associated 
64  Elizabeth Kamaldin, Singapore Needs to Change Its Filial-piety Mindset, AsiaOne, Oct. 10, 2012, at 
http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20121010-376608.
html.
65  See generally Findlay, supra note 59, ch. 9.
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challenge for public international law. Due to the determination to individualize 
international criminal liability, the fundamental bonds (and essential purposes) 
of  public international law can be envisaged beyond state-to-state relationships. 
The individualization of  liability through international criminal prosecution 
also goes beyond the individualized rights paradigms of  international humani-
tarian law. Developments in ICL and ICJ (as modes of  global governance) have 
increased the utility of  public international law to address many of  the “big is-
sue” divergent concerns of  states in the Asia Pacific region that are multi-polar 
and not only bilateral. International law can be reinvigorated for these states as a 
medium for individualizing and aggregating responsibility, and seeking out redress 
where responsibility has too long been denied by the hegemonic interests behind 
the limited interpretation of  public international law and its potential outreach. 
Membership in international justice alliances can now be argued to bring with it 
the more inclusive benefits of  global governance.
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